This paper examines conflicting ballot proposals-two or more measures that run contrary to one another and that citizens vote on in the same election. Sometimes a majority votes in favor of more than one conflicting proposal, generating a legal impasse that courts resolve by applying the "highest vote rule." The rule upholds the proposal that received the greatest number of affirmative votes and invalidates all competing proposals, even though they also garnered majority support. Using spatial models, we show that the proposal receiving the most votes is not systematically closest to the median voter's ideal point, and consequently the rule can generate antimajoritarian outcomes. We discuss the implications of our finding, analyze and reject existing alternatives to the highest vote rule, and propose an original solution to the problem.
INTRODUCTION
Voters who participate in direct democracy often confront ballots that include two or more proposals addressing the same issue and running contrary to one another. Conflicting proposals, or counterproposals, have been a feature of American direct democracy for decades (Bowler and Donovan 1998, pp. 17-18) . Usually, conflicting proposals arise when a legislature or interest group opposes a qualified measure and offers an alternative. A notorious example of this unfolded in California in 1988, when the insurance industry, trial lawyers, and consumer groups placed five competing initiatives relating to auto insurance on the same ballot (see Lupia 1994) .
Sponsors of a counterproposal often are not primarily motivated to enact their measure, but they always aim to defeat competing measures. They use counterproposals to split the vote and to make the ballot so complicated that voters become confused and vote "no" on everything. Sometimes this works, but other times it fails. Voters can examine conflicting proposals, give majority support to one measure they favor, and defeat all competing measures. Or voters can produce a more confounding result: simultaneous passage of two or more proposals that run contrary to one another.
When conflicting proposals pass, courts resolve the impasse with a simple rule: uphold the proposal that received the greatest number of affirmative votes against all other conflicting measures, even though they too received majority support. This "highest vote rule" seems defensible: if more citizens vote for proposal A than proposal B, then the former should prevail. But this reasoning is spurious.
We develop a spatial model of voting on competing proposals and show that the highest vote rule does not systematically select the proposal closest to the median voter's ideal point. Instead, the rule selects the proposal closest to the status quo. When the proposal closest to the status quo is farther from the median than other measures, the rule fails: a proposal discarded by the rule would have defeated the proposal selected by the rule in a head-to-head vote. We offer a solution that would require voters to vote in two steps: first, between each conflicting proposal and the status quo, and second, between conflicting proposals that receive majority support. This approach should select the proposal closest to the median.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on conflicting ballot proposals and examines the highest vote rule. Section 3 presents the spatial model and shows why the highest vote rule can lead to antimajoritarian outcomes. We support the analysis with original data. Section 4 examines the normative implications of the model and considers alternative procedures for choosing among conflicting proposals.
BACKGROUND ON CONFLICTING PROPOSALS AND THE HIGHEST VOTE RULE
Counterproposals have been a feature of American direct democracy for decades. In 1928, Oregonians voted on four separate proposals to regulate river fishing (Mason 1994, p. 206) . In 1939, an observer of direct democracy in California noted that "conflicting measures often appear on the same ballot" (Cottrell 1939, p. 40) . In recent years, counterproposals have become more common, as initiative sponsors have become more sophisticated and learned to qualify measures on short notice (Donovan and Bowler 1998, pp. 10-11) . In addition to the five insurance measures they faced in 1988, Californians voted on competing proposals again in 1990, 1996, 2004, and 2005 . As described in the Appendix, voters in eight states encountered 56 conflicts involving 124 ballot proposals between 1980 and 2006. In this section, we review the motivations for qualifying a counterproposal, the role of judges in identifying conflicts, and the rules for dealing with competing measures that pass simultaneously. 
Logic of Counterproposals
Sometimes sponsors want to pass their counterproposal, but other times they do not care about their proposal and simply use it to reduce support for the original measure. Consider, for example, the November 1990 election in California. In response to a proposal to ban several pesticides, chemical groups qualified a less stringent countermeasure. They did not prefer their countermeasure to the status quo but qualified it because they knew it would be "extremely difficult to defeat [the original proposal] with a 'no' campaign only" (Stein 1993, pp. 155-56) .
Counterproposals can reduce support for original proposals by splitting the vote.
2 A counterproposal that is more moderate than the original may appeal to voters who prefer incremental policy change. Counterproposals can also complicate the ballot. "Part of the strategy 'is to confuse voters . . . and [to make] the ballot so long that voters out of frustration and fatigue vote No on all measures'" (Bowler and Donovan 1. We limit our discussion to statewide ballot proposals. We use the terms "ballot proposal" and "measure" interchangeably, and they refer to either an initiative or a referendum. An "initiative" is a measure drafted by private citizens, and a "referendum" is a measure drafted by the state legislature. We often refer to conflicts between just two proposals. Because more than two conflicting proposals can pass at the same time, our analysis in Section 3 considers the general case.
2. This assumes that voters vote only for their most preferred alternative, an assumption we reject in Section 3.
1998, p. 18). This tactic worked in California's 1990 election. "Faced with 27 complicated initiatives and counterinitiatives on different issues, voters rejected 23" (Shultz 1998, p. 83) . According to the author of an unsuccessful measure, "Voters simply threw their hands up in despair and voted 'no' on everything" (Shultz 1998, pp. 83-84 ).
Yet counterproposals do not always succeed. Sometimes the counterproposal fails and the original measure it sought to undercut passes.
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Other times, a majority supports multiple ballot proposals on the same issue at the same time. For example, Californians in 1982 approved two proposals regarding criminal laws that contained conflicting provisions. They did it again in 1988, lending majority support to competing measures on campaign finance reform. In 2000, a majority of Arizonans voted in favor of conflicting proposals addressing health care. As counterproposals crop up with increasing frequency, simultaneous passage of conflicting measures could become more common.
Role of Courts in Identifying Conflicts
When conflicting proposals pass, courts resolve the conundrum. 4 First they determine whether the proposals actually conflict. Courts approach this task in different ways, and we divide their methods into two categories: piecemeal and wholesale. Bill 1078 , 536 P.2d 308, 313 [Colo. 1975 ). To determine this, courts scrutinize the conflicting measures line by line. If 3. Faced with the "political tsunami of Proposition 13," which would drastically reduce property taxes, California legislators tried to "lure voters with a moderate alternative, Proposition 8. Too little, too late, the counter-measure was defeated handily," and Proposition 13 passed (Shultz 1998, p. 82) .
4. In Utah, the governor decides whether the proposals conflict (Utah Code Ann., sec. 20 A-7-211(3)(b) [Supp. 1994] ).
5. Sometimes the drafters of a ballot proposal include language stating that all or part of their measure conflicts with another measure that appears on the same ballot. Such statements notify voters of the conflict, and they ease the judicial task by specifying the conflict's reach. But they can be nefarious. Drafters can state that their proposal and another are in complete conflict even if this is not accurate. They can even include "ballot viruses" that, if approved along with the rest of the proposal, would nullify other, unrelated proposals. An extreme example of this arose in California. "Hidden in the guise of a proposition that would limit taxation and allow more voter control of finances, Proposition 136 contained language that would have infected and completely eliminated four unrelated measures on the November 1990 ballot" (DuVivier 1995 (DuVivier , pp. 1216 . Proposition 136 did not pass, and to date no court has issued an opinion on ballot viruses. some provisions are incapable of simultaneous enactment, there is a conflict.
The piecemeal approach simplifies the judicial task-either proposals textually conflict or they do not-but it can lead to unfavorable policy combinations. To illustrate, Oregon voters in 1908 approved two competing ballot measures, one that restricted upstream fishing on the Columbia River and another that restricted downstream fishing. Textually, these measures did not conflict, but together they closed the river to nearly all fishing, despite the importance of this industry to the local economy (Bowler and Donovan 1998, pp. 118-19; Eaton 1912, pp. 65-68) . Courts applying piecemeal analysis would have upheld both measures, an outcome that many voters opposed.
Under the wholesale approach, courts do not parse individual provisions of competing measures but instead examine them in toto. "Ballot measures addressing the same subject are to be examined as a whole and, if they offer conflicting regulatory schemes for governance of that subject," there is a conflict (Taxpayers To Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220 , 1222 [Cal. 1990 ).
The wholesale approach prevents outcomes like the Oregon fish example in which measures not technically in conflict are permitted to coexist even though they result in an undesired policy. But it also makes the judicial task more subjective. Determining whether two proposals offer "conflicting regulatory schemes" is less concrete than deciding whether two blocks of text contradict one another.
Resolving Conflicting Proposals: The Highest Vote Rule
Regardless of which approach courts use to identify conflicts, upon finding a conflict they must resolve it. Of the 24 states that permit citizensponsored initiatives, 16 use the highest vote rule for this, as does the District of Columbia.
6 Maine and Washington force voters to choose between conflicting provisions, making it impossible for more than one to pass. The remaining six states have no rule in place for resolving conflicts (Dubois and Feeney 1998, pp. 158-60) .
The highest vote rule requires courts to give precedence to the conflicting measure that received the greatest number of affirmative votes. The following example will clarify: "If initiative A . . . were to be adopted by 51,000 to 49,000 votes and initiative B by 50,000 to 40,000 6. In addition to the 15 states listed in Dubois and Feeney (1998, votes, initiative A would have the larger number of affirmative votes (51,000 versus 50,000), but initiative B would have a greater majority (10,000 versus 1,000 votes) and a higher percentage of the total vote (55 versus 51 percent)" (Dubois and Feeney 1998, pp. 158-60) . In every state with the highest vote rule, initiative A would be declared the winner.
Courts apply the highest vote rule in two ways, and these correspond with the piecemeal and wholesale methods for detecting conflicts. Courts that use the piecemeal method generally do not strike down in its entirety the conflicting measure that received fewer votes but instead invalidate just those provisions that textually conflict with the measure receiving more votes. All provisions of both proposals that do not textually conflict take effect. Because voters approved both measures, courts reason, " [i] t is logical to infer that they intended that both initiatives take effect to the greatest extent possible" (Taxpayers To Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 260 Cal. Rptr. 898, 907 [Cal. Ct. App. 1989 ], reversed by Taxpayers, 799 P.2d 1220). We call this the harmonization approach.
Courts that apply the wholesale method for detecting conflicts often use the highest vote rule to strike down the measure receiving fewer votes in its entirety. This approach spares judges from cobbling together an amalgam that was never submitted for a vote. But it can void entire measures that have only a minor conflict. For this reason, courts demand that the conflict surpass some threshold magnitude before invalidating the measure receiving fewer votes. 7 We call this the all-or-nothing approach.
The highest vote rule makes intuitive sense. Ballot proposals permit "the people" to express their preferences directly. When conflicting measures pass, the proposal receiving the most affirmative votes offers the "clearest expression" of the people's preferences and should prevail (In re Interrogatories, 536 P.2d 315). That 16 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the rule evinces its appeal, as does its inclusion in the Initiative and Referendum Institute's model legislation on initiatives (Waters 2003, p. 532) . According to the Colorado Supreme Court, the rule furthers not only the "principles of initiative and referendum" but also the "most fundamental principles of the federal constitution" (In re Interrogatories, 536 P.2d 314-15).
7. In Taxpayers (799 P.2d 1237 n.12), the California Supreme Court noted that when only "minor provisions" of one proposal "happen to conflict" with those of another, complete invalidation may be unnecessary.
This support is misplaced. Contrary to intuition, the highest vote rule can thwart majority will by enacting voters' second-choice proposal (or worse) instead of their first.
A SPATIAL MODEL OF THE HIGHEST VOTE RULE
We use a spatial model to analyze the highest vote rule. Before introducing the model we review the literature on point. Banducci (1995) develops a model in which conflicting proposals are nonseparable from one another in citizens' utility functions. She concludes that informed voters will vote only for the alternative that they most prefer, and the winner will be the proposal that is closest to the median voter's ideal point. Similarly, Hugh-Jones (2006) develops and tests a model of voting on competing proposals and finds some evidence that voters behave strategically. He suggests that policy converges to the median more quickly when counterproposals are present. Ferejohn (1995) also argues that counterproposals push policy to the median, but his model does not incorporate nonseparable preferences or strategic behavior. He assumes that voters vote in favor of everything they prefer to the status quo. In a brief, nongeneral example, Haskell (2001, pp. 140-42) appears to adopt this same assumption and shows how such voting can generate a suboptimal outcome.
Literature Review
Finally, Dubin, Kiewiet, and Noussair (1992) identify the incentives of voters to behave strategically in the face of competing proposals. For example, they show that some voters who prefer both proposals to the status quo may vote against their second choice to ensure that their first choice gets the most affirmative votes.
We contribute to this literature by developing and extending Ferejohn (1995) and Haskell (2001) . We also address the normative issues raised by this analysis and examine alternative solutions to the conflicting proposals problem.
The Model
We make five assumptions. First, we assume that conflicting ballot proposals can be situated on a single policy dimension. The assumption is reasonable because most state constitutions contain a single-subject rule for ballot proposals, a primary purpose of which is to constrain them to a single dimension of choice (Cooter and Gilbert 2006) . 8 Second, we assume that voters have complete, transitive preferences that are single peaked and symmetrical. Third, we assume that voters' ideal points are distributed uniformly around a unique median.
9 Fourth, we assume that voters are sincere, by which we mean that they vote in favor of every ballot proposal they prefer to the status quo.
10 Fifth, we assume that courts apply the highest vote rule in all-or-nothing fashion.
We now develop the spatial model. Suppose that two competing proposals, A and B, appear on the ballot, and they are located between SQ, the status quo policy, and M, the median voter's ideal point. Proposal B calls for a more radical change in policy than does A. Plausible positions for these measures are sketched in Figure 1 . Point SQ is the same distance from M as SQ.
In every state with the highest vote rule, A and B are paired against the status quo in separate votes. In the contest between SQ and A, A prevails. To determine the proportion of votes that A receives, we draw a vertical, dotted bisector that is halfway between SQ and A. Voters with ideal points left of this bisector prefer the status quo, and voters with ideal points right of this bisector prefer A. The horizontal dotted 8. Courts in many states apply the single-subject rule strictly enough to limit proposals to one dimension. Since 1980, success rates in single-subject challenges equal or exceed 55 percent in Colorado (72 single-subject decisions, 40 violations), 33 percent in Oklahoma (11 decisions, four violations) and Washington (nine decisions, three violations), and 25 percent in Florida (56 decisions, 14 violations) (Gilbert 2008) . Only 13 percent of singlesubject challenges succeeded in California (32 decisions, four violations), but some observers claim the most recent successful case, Senate v. Jones (988 P.2d 1089 [Cal. 1999] ), set a stricter precedent, narrowing subsequent proposals (for example, Lowenstein 2002) . In addition to the single-subject rule, strategy may lead sponsors to limit their proposals to one dimension, as adding extra issues can increase opposition (Kousser and McCubbins 2005; compare Kadane 1972) .
9. The uniformity assumption is not necessary, but we adopt it to simplify the analysis. 10. We also assume that voters know the status quo when they vote-a presumption courts already make (Larson v. Duca, 261 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561 [Cal. Ct. App. 1989] ).
line reflects the fraction of the electorate that votes for A, a substantial majority.
This analysis follows from the median-voter theorem (Downs 1957; Black 1958 ). Under our assumptions, the theory states that in a pairwise contest between any two proposals, the one closer to the median voter's ideal point will prevail. A policy proposal exactly equal to the median voter's ideal point would defeat all other proposals in a pairwise contest.
We now apply this analysis to the vote between SQ and B. Because B is closer than SQ to the median voter's ideal point, we know that it prevails. To determine the proportion of votes that B receives, we draw a vertical, dashed bisector that is halfway between SQ and B. Voters with ideal points left of the dashed bisector prefer the status quo, and voters with ideal points right of the dashed bisector prefer B. The horizontal dashed line reflects the fraction of the electorate that votes for B.
Because A and B conflict and both received majority support, the highest vote rule determines which takes effect. The dotted horizontal line is longer than the dashed horizontal line, which means that a larger fraction of the electorate voted for A than for B. Therefore, the highest vote rule invalidates B and declares A the winner-even though B is closer to the median voter's ideal point and would defeat A in a pairwise vote.
We generalize this example with a proposition:
Proposition. The conflicting ballot proposal closest to the status quo always receives the highest number of affirmative votes and prevails under the highest vote rule.
Suppose there are n proposals between SQ and SQ . The midpoint between SQ and the proposal closest to it, P SQϩ1 , will necessarily be left of the midpoint between SQ and any other proposal P n(SQϩ1 . Because all voters with ideal points right of the midpoint between SQ and a given proposal vote for that proposal, and because there are more voters right of the midpoint between SQ and P SQϩ1 than any other midpoint, P SQϩ1 will always prevail under the highest vote rule.
If all competing proposals fall between SQ and M, the highest vote rule selects the proposal closest to SQ, and that proposal would, in a pairwise vote, lose to all other competing proposals on the ballot. Ironically, the proposal receiving the fewest votes would be closest to the median voter's ideal point.
The highest vote rule does not always generate antimajoritarian outcomes. In Figure 2 , conflicting proposals A and B are again submitted to the electorate, but now they lie on the opposite side of the median relative to the status quo.
Proposal A defeats SQ in the first vote. The vertical, dotted bisector indicates the midpoint between SQ and A. Voters with ideal points right of that bisector, a majority, vote for A. The horizontal dotted line reflects the portion of the electorate that supports A. By the same logic, B defeats SQ in the second vote. The horizontal dashed line represents the portion of the electorate that votes for B.
Because conflicting proposals A and B pass, the proposition above states that the proposal closest to the status quo, in this case A, will receive the most votes, and it does. The dotted horizontal line is longer than the dashed horizontal line. So the highest vote rule invalidates B and declares A the winner. This outcome is majoritarian: A is closer to the median voter's ideal point and would defeat B in a pairwise vote.
More generally, if n proposals fall between M and SQ , the proposal closest to M is also closest to SQ and will prevail under the highest vote rule. Figure 3 depicts the final scenario. Conflicting proposals A and B are proposed simultaneously, and they lie on opposite sides of the median position. Both A and B defeat SQ. Because A is closer to SQ, it receives more votes, as shown by the relative lengths of the horizontal dotted and dashed lines. Therefore, the highest vote rule upholds A and discards B, but B is closer to the median and would defeat A in a pairwise vote. Shifting both proposals to the right could change this result. Because it is closest to the status quo, A would always receive the most votes, and in an array of circumstances it would also be closest to the median. More generally, if n proposals fall between SQ and SQ , and there is at least one proposal on each side of the median, the highest vote rule will always select the proposal closest to SQ, and that proposal may or may not be closest to M. 11. This analysis applies to unidirectional conflicting proposals-measures that fall on We assume that voters are sincere-that they vote in favor of everything they prefer to the status quo. Do voters behave this way? Banducci (1995) , Hugh-Jones (2006) , and Dubin, Kiewiet, and Noussair (1992) suggest that they do not. But their analyses, respectively, require voters to understand when proposals conflict and vote only for the one they most prefer, coordinate their behavior and vote in blocks, and sift through interest group cues and vote strategically. Voters may not always behave in these ways. Information can be scarce, and citizens may vote for all proposals they favor to ensure at least one passes. Voters in large electorates probably cannot coordinate. And messages from interest groups may be muddled. In such circumstances, we hypothesize that voters vote sincerely.
To be clear, we do not argue that all voters vote sincerely. Probably some sincere and some strategic voters participate in every election. If a sufficient number of voters are sincere, however, they can induce the same result that would hold if all voters were sincere. 12 We contend that this occurs often enough to justify our sincere-voting assumption.
the same side of the status quo. It does not apply to bidirectional conflicting proposalsmeasures that fall on opposite sides of the status quo. If two proposals are in bidirectional conflict, one of them is necessarily outside of the range [SQ, SQ ] and would not receive majority support under our assumptions. Perhaps because of this, voters are rarely presented with bidirectional conflicting proposals, but they do arise. For example, Oregonians in 1998 voted on two competing proposals: one sought to prohibit public employee unions from collecting a part of worker' paychecks and using the money for political purposes, and the other sought not only to sanction this behavior but to bolster it by placing a right in the state constitution permitting such practices. The second proposal passed, and the first one failed. We know of no instance in which bidirectional conflicting proposals passed simultaneously.
12. We can express this mathematically. Suppose voters are uniformly distributed on a 1-unit dimension, and suppose further that and that SQ ! A ! B ! SQ FM Ϫ SQF 1 and . Under our assumptions, both A and B receive support FM Ϫ AF FM Ϫ SQF 1 FM Ϫ BF from the fraction of the electorate , a majority. But A receives additional 1 Ϫ (B ϩ SQ)/2 support from the fraction of the electorate and trumps B under the highest vote
We test this with empirical evidence. Our proposition states that when voters vote sincerely, the proposal closest to the status quo receives the greatest number of affirmative votes. The proposition does not require the proposals to pass. In Figure 2 , shifting A and B right of SQ implies that neither defeats the status quo in a pairwise vote, but the proposition still predicts that A receives more votes than B. Given this, we can examine sets of conflicting proposals-regardless of whether none, one, or all of those proposals passed-and determine whether the proposal closest to the status quo received more votes. 13 We identified every conflicting proposal that appeared on the ballot between 1980 and 2006 in eight states that frequently use direct democracy: Arizona, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and South Dakota. There were 56 instances of competing proposals. Some proposals were mutually contradictory: for example, a measure that would ban smoking in bars versus a measure that would permit it under certain circumstances.
14 Others were not contradictory but addressed the same issue and could be substitutes. For example, one proposal authorized the sale of bonds, funds from which would provide shelter for the homeless, while another proposal established new fines and channeled the proceeds to the homeless. 15 Still other proposals were neither contradictory nor obvious substitutes but occupied the same narrow policy dimension. For example, one proposal required parental notification for abortions, and another prohibited abortions except in certain circumstances. 16 The Appendix contains information on these proposals.
In 24 of the 56 sets of competing proposals, the measure closest to the status quo received the most votes. In 13 sets of competing proposals, the measure closest to the status quo did not get the most votes. In the other 19 instances, we could not determine which proposal was closest to the status quo or the conflict was bidirectional; we could not test our hypothesis with those measures. Although the sample is small, these results suggest that voters vote sincerely more than half of the time.
rule. At a minimum, the fraction of voters plus one more voter would have to (B Ϫ A)/2 behave strategically for B to receive more votes than A. This generates a prediction: as the policy distance between competing proposals A and B increases, election results consistent with sincere voting become more likely.
13. The Appendix describes how we determined which competing proposal was closest to the status quo.
14. Observing instances in which the proposal closest to the status quo receives more votes is necessary but not sufficient to assert that voters are sincere. Under various scenarios, strategic voting could also yield this outcome. Consequently, our study is suggestive but not conclusive. However, our sincere-voting assumption seems especially reasonable when conflicting measures pass simultaneously, which is the only scenario that triggers the highest vote rule. Such conflicting proposals probably did not receive support from discrete majorities; some (and possibly many) voters voted for both. We examined elections in which more than one competing proposal passed and found that the proposal closest to the status quo received the most votes in three out of four instances. 17 We present all four instances as case studies.
In June 1982, Californians voted on conflicting Propositions 5 and 6, both of which sought to repeal the state's inheritance tax. Proposition 6 repealed the tax upon passage, whereas Proposition 5 repealed the tax going forward and also made the tax break retroactive, making it the more extreme measure. Both propositions passed, with Proposition 5 receiving 3,208,394 affirmative votes and Proposition 6 receiving 3,300,547 affirmative votes. As hypothesized, the proposal closer to the status quo, Proposition 6, received more votes.
In a second example, Californians in June 1988 passed competing Propositions 68 and 73 to reform the state's campaign finance system. Proposition 68 imposed limits on contributions and expenditures, but Proposition 73 addressed only contributions and left existing expenditure rules in place. Proposition 68 received 2,802,614 affirmative votes, and Proposition 73 received 3,144,944 affirmative votes. Proposition 73, the "weaker" of the two measures (Witt 1988) , was closer to the status quo, and it received more votes.
In November 1982, voters in Michigan approved competing proposals D and H. Both proposals responded to a law permitting utility companies to raise rates without a general rate hearing. Proposal D simply prohibited utilities from raising rates without a general hearing.
17. We identified every instance between 1980 and 2006 in which statewide proposals that are explicitly contradictory (category 1 conflicts as defined in the Appendix) passed simultaneously. We did not confine our search to eight states but used the Westlaw database to examine highest vote rule litigation in every state with the initiative process. We observed seven such instances. In three of them we could not determine which competing proposal was closest to the status quo Referred by the legislature, proposal H permitted utility companies to raise rates but required them to hold a limited hearing first. Proposal H was closer to the status quo, and it received more votes than Proposal D: 1,670,381 to 1,472,442.
The lone counterexample comes from Nevada, where voters in 1996 approved competing proposals 11 and 16. The former increased the percentage of legislators required to approve tax increases from a simple majority to two-thirds. The latter retained the existing threshold but required legislators to approve tax increases twice before they could take effect. Measure 16 was the legislators' alternative to 11, and it received fewer votes: 255,830 to 301,382.
Our analysis in this section suggests that while voters may sometimes vote strategically, they vote sincerely much of the time. The sincerevoting assumption is especially robust when competing proposals pass simultaneously, which is the only situation that implicates the highest vote rule. Consequently, we believe our assumption is reasonable.
RECONSIDERING THE HIGHEST VOTE RULE
In this section, we argue that the highest vote rule is not justifiable and then briefly examine six alternatives to it, including an original mechanism we call the "Swiss two-step."
Is the Highest Vote Rule Justifiable?
Direct democracy aims to empower democratic majorities and weaken special interests. Therefore, a ballot proposal should be chosen over another such proposal only if more private citizens would vote for the former in a pairwise contest. When the highest vote rule fails to select the proposal closest to the median voter's ideal point, it gives precedence to a proposal that would garner fewer votes in a pairwise contest. This weakens democratic majorities by giving them their second-choice proposal or worse, and it empowers special interests by privileging the status quo. The highest vote rule is inconsistent with the purposes of direct democracy.
Despite this, arguments can be made in support of the rule. First, the most troubling scenario-when all proposals fall between the status quo and the median, and the rule selects the one farthest from the medianmay rarely arise. This is because initiative sponsors tend to offer extreme proposals (Kousser and McCubbins 2005) . Because it is cheaper to lobby the legislature than to draft, qualify, and promote an initiative, sponsors will not take the latter course unless legislators oppose their proposalprobably because it is far from the status quo and the median. As shown in the figures, sponsors are more likely to offer a proposal near SQ than between SQ and M.
In this scenario, the rule does not automatically select the proposal farthest from the median. If the original proposal is near SQ , any counterproposal between SQ and that proposal would receive more votes, and most points in that range are closer to the median. But this is not a panacea. Original proposals probably do not always approach SQ , and even if they did, counterproposals could be worse. In response to any proposal, a competing interest group could qualify a countermeasure closer to the status quo but farther from the median. That countermeasure would receive more votes and prevail under the highest vote rule.
This example implies that if any group benefits from the status quo and will incur the costs necessary to offer a counterproposal, no or merely incremental policy change is possible. Sponsors will not offer original proposals because they foresee defeat by counterproposals, thereby locking in the status quo, or they will offer measures that lose to counterproposals close to the status quo, thus slowing the pace of desired policy change.
This raises a second defense of the highest vote rule. When conflicting proposals pass, the rule always selects a proposal closer than the status quo to the median, even if that proposal is not closest among the alternatives to the median. The winning proposal becomes the new status quo, and the next time competing proposals pass, the rule will again select an option closer to the median. Policy eventually will converge to the median. This defense ignores transaction costs. Qualifying ballot proposals, administering elections, and implementing and enforcing measures that pass can lead to substantial expenses (Kousser and McCubbins 2005) . If the highest vote rule can be reformed such that policy converges to the median with fewer elections, and if the costs of reforming the rule are lower than retaining it, then reform should proceed.
This implicates a final defense of the highest vote rule: it is easy for judges to administer. If one could not devise a superior rule without complicating adjudication, this argument may be persuasive. But superior, administrable procedures can be devised.
Alternatives to the Highest Vote Rule
We examine six alternatives to the highest vote rule. They are divided into two categories: procedures that would prevent conflicting proposals from passing simultaneously, and rules for dealing with competing measures when they do pass.
Maine and Washington Procedures. Election procedures in Maine
and Washington prevent competing proposals from passing simultaneously. Under the Maine procedure, citizens cast one vote over competing proposals. Either they vote "no," meaning that they prefer the status quo to all alternatives, or they vote "yes" for one particular measure. If any measure receives more than 50 percent of the vote, it becomes law. Otherwise, the status quo prevails (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 21-A, sec. 906(6)(D)). Switzerland used a similar method for at least a century (Dubois and Feeney 1998) .
Because the Maine procedure forbids voters from casting more than one "yes" vote, conflicting measures cannot pass simultaneously, obviating the need for the highest vote rule. But the procedure has a flaw: it can split the vote. Suppose that competing proposals A and B are submitted to the electorate. Suppose further that 80 percent of voters prefer either alternative to the status quo, and of that 80 percent, one half most prefers A and the other half most prefers B. If everyone votes for their first-choice policy, the status quo receives 20 percent of the vote and A and B each receive 40 percent of the vote. Since no proposal commands a majority, the Maine procedure preserves the status quo. But 80 percent of voters would prefer either of the conflicting measures. The Maine procedure can lock in an unfavorable status quo.
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Under the Washington procedure, citizens vote on conflicting proposals in two steps (Washington Constitution, art. II, sec. 1(a)). In the first step, they vote "no" if they oppose all competing proposals and "yes" if they support one or more of them. In the second step, all voters, including those who voted "no" in the first step, cast a single "yes" vote for the one competing proposal that they most prefer. The status quo is not included among the proposals in step 2. If a majority votes "yes" in the first step, the alternative receiving the most "yes" votes in the second step becomes law. Otherwise, the status quo prevails.
When our assumptions hold, when there are only two conflicting 18. Swiss voters seemed to agree; they revised their method for dealing with counterproposals in 1987 (Kriesi 2005, pp. 80-81) . proposals, and when they are in unidirectional conflict (which means that both are on the same side of SQ), then the Washington procedure always selects the proposal closest to the median voter's ideal point.
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To see why, suppose at least one proposal is closer than the status quo to the median voter. A majority prefers that proposal to the status quo and votes "yes" in step 1.
Step 2 is a pairwise contest between the competing proposals, and the one closest to the median voter's ideal point prevails.
The Washington procedure does not always produce such results. When there are three or more competing proposals, the rule does not necessarily select the one closest to the median.
20 Worse yet, where bidirectional proposals are concerned (which means that the proposals are on opposite sides of SQ), the rule can make a majority worse off than the status quo. Figure 4 illustrates. The status quo policy is identical to the median voter's ideal point. Proposal A would move policy left of the status quo, and the counterproposal B would move policy right of it.
All voters with ideal points left of the midpoint between A and SQ prefer A to the status quo and vote "yes" in step 1. Likewise, voters 19. In the context of the Washington procedure, our sincere-voting assumption means that voters vote "yes" in step 1 if they prefer any proposal to the status quo, and they vote "yes" in step 2 for the proposal they most prefer. 20. We illustrate with an example. Suppose the dimension of choice is 1 unit long, the status quo is at 0, the median voter's ideal point is at .5, and conflicting proposals A, B, and C are at .4, .5, and .7, respectively. All voters with ideal points right of .2 (or 80 percent of voters) prefer at least one proposal to the status quo and vote "yes" in step 1. In step 2, voters with ideal points between 0 and .45 (or 45 percent of voters) are closest to proposal A and vote for it. Voters with ideal points between .45 and .6 (or 15 percent of voters) are closest to proposal B and vote for it. Voters with ideal points greater than .6 (40 percent of voters) are closest to proposal C and vote for it. Proposal A wins, but proposal B is closer to (in fact, identical to) the median voter's ideal point.
with ideal points right of the midpoint between B and SQ prefer B and also vote "yes" in step 1. This constitutes a majority. In step 2, a majority prefers B to A. While closer than A to M, B is farther from M than the status quo. This election leaves a majority of voters worse off.
Strategic voting can prevent this outcome, but that requires voters to coordinate their behavior around a confusing system. The Washington procedure was last used in 1988. Voters were "flustered" by it (Robinson 1988, p. A18) , with many failing to complete both steps. As a consequence, then Secretary of State Ralph Munro advocating replacing the Washington procedure with the highest vote rule, which he argued is easier to understand and administer (Robinson 1988) . Because of these problems, we conclude that the Washington procedure is a flawed method for dealing with competing proposals.
Other Alternatives.
Here we examine four more alternatives to the highest vote rule. Unlike the Maine and Washington procedures, each would permit conflicting proposals to pass at the same time.
We begin with the "nullify everything" approach. Some judges and commentators contend that when competing proposals pass, none should take effect and the status quo should remain in force. The theory is that when voters simultaneously approve conflicting measures, "it is impossible to know the final will of the electors and to give it effect" (Opinion to the Governor, 80 A.2d 165, 167 [R.I. 1951 Moreover, opponents of a popular proposal would need only offer a popular counterproposal: both will pass and neither will take effect, leaving an unpopular status quo in place. For these reasons, we reject the nullify-everything approach.
The second alternative we consider is harmonization. For the spatial models we assumed that courts apply the highest vote rule in all-ornothing fashion, meaning they invalidate the proposal receiving fewer votes in its entirety. But some courts harmonize conflicting proposals. Under this approach, courts invalidate just those provisions of the measure receiving fewer votes that textually conflict with provisions in the 21. Accordingly, even a mechanism that randomly selects one proposal from those receiving majority support would be more defensible than the nullify-everything approach. Consider Figure 5 , and suppose that n conflicting proposals fall between SQ and M. The all-or-nothing highest vote rule selects the proposal closest to SQ, P SQϩ1 (not pictured). By contrast, harmonization combines the proposals and, on average, generates a policy near the middle of the spectrum, P ✻ . Proposal P ✻ is closer than P SQϩ1 to M and defeats it in a pairwise vote, so harmonization outperforms all-or-nothing. Now suppose that n proposals fall between M and SQ . The all-ornothing approach selects the proposal closest to M, P Mϩ1 (not pictured). Harmonization generates a policy near the middle of the spectrum, P ✻✻ . Proposal P ✻✻ is farther than P Mϩ1 from M and loses to it in a pairwise vote. Here, harmonization performs worse than all-or-nothing.
In the final scenario, suppose n proposals fall between SQ and SQ and straddle the median. The highest vote rule selects the proposal closest to SQ, P SQϩ1 . On average, harmonization generates a policy in the middle of the spectrum, P ✻✻✻ . Proposal P ✻✻✻ matches the median voter's ideal point, the optimal outcome. In this scenario, harmonization is superior to all-or-nothing.
This analysis assumes that harmonization averages policy positions. But provisions of multiple proposals that do not textually conflict can interact to create a policy more extreme than the original proposals. In such circumstances, harmonization does not average policy positions and could lead to undesirable outcomes.
Harmonization has other costs as well. It requires judges to create new polices from the scraps of old ones-"a Frankenstein's monster whose existence the voters never contemplated" (Taxpayers, 799 P.2d 1245 [Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting]). It also creates accountability problems. The all-or-nothing method selects a complete policy that voters can attribute to its sponsors. Harmonization creates a hybrid that can be blamed on courts. For these reasons we reject harmonization.
Next we examine the Swiss system used in that country since 1987. When competing proposals appear on the ballot, voters there cast three votes: one between the original proposal and the status quo, a second between the counterproposal and the status quo, and a third between the competing proposals. If a majority votes in favor of the proposal and the counterproposal in the first two votes, the third vote determines which conflicting measure takes effect. The proposal closest to the median voter's ideal point will command a majority in the third vote. Therefore, the Swiss system selects the proposal closest to the median where two proposals are concerned.
When there are more than two proposals, the Swiss system breaks down. Suppose three conflicting measures appear on the ballot, and all three defeat the status quo in head-to-head votes. Citizens must then decide which of the three they most prefer. If they are permitted to cast just one vote over the three options, the situation is identical to step 2 of the Washington procedure. As discussed, that process may not select the proposal closest to the median when there are more than two proposals. Alternatively, citizens could cast a series of pairwise votes between the proposals (A versus B, A versus C, and B versus C) to determine which is closest to the median. 22 This would be cumbersome, requiring six votes-one between each proposal and the status quo and one between each pairing of proposals-to decide one issue. In California's 1988 election with five insurance measures on the ballot, citizens would have had to cast 15 votes to determine the winner. Absent restrictions on the number of conflicting proposals that can appear on a single ballot, the Swiss system is impractical.
Our fourth alternative, which is hypothetical, improves the Swiss system and is our preferred solution. We call it the Swiss two-step. We would not require voters in a single election to choose between (a) the original proposal and the status quo, (b) the counterproposal(s) and the status quo, and (c) the competing proposals. Rather, we would require voters to complete steps a and b, as they do currently in states with the highest vote rule. If two or more competing proposals pass, voters would vote pairwise on the competing proposals (that is, A versus B) in the next election. The proposal that defeats all others would be enacted.
Like the Swiss system, and unlike the highest vote rule, the two-step 22. Under our assumptions, only the proposal closest to the median would defeat all others in the pairwise votes. system should systematically select the proposal closest to the median. It also mitigates the drawback of the existing Swiss system by eliminating superfluous votes. The first vote will clear the field of all but the proposals preferred to the status quo, and only those proposals will be paired against one another in the subsequent election. The number of votes cast under the two-step system will be less than or equal to the number cast under the existing Swiss system.
The two-step system would strengthen the incentive to qualify original proposals and weaken the incentive to qualify counterproposals. Under the highest vote rule, counterproposals close to the status quo can defeat measures close to the median, which encourages special interests to offer counterproposals to stymie policy reform. Under the twostep system, counterproposals can defeat original proposals only if they are closer to the median. This discourages special interests from offering counterproposals when they cannot protect the status quo. Less risk of being undercut by a counterproposal means sponsors are more likely to offer original proposals.
Policy would converge to the median voter's ideal point more quickly under the two-step system. While the highest vote rule prevents or at least slows reform, the two-step system ensures that the proposal closest to the median voter's ideal point prevails.
Finally, while the Swiss system requires conflicting proposals to be identified before voting takes place, the two-step system would not require action to be taken until two or more conflicting proposals pass. Courts may not favor preelection review of ballot proposals, and judicial economy cautions against litigating the classification of conflicting measures unless necessary. For these reasons, the two-step system offers a superior means for resolving conflicting proposals.
CONCLUSION
Competing ballot proposals have been a feature of American direct democracy for decades. So has the highest vote rule, the standard mechanism for resolving the impasse created when conflicting proposals pass simultaneously. The rule selects the proposal closest to the status quo, sometimes at the expense of other proposals closer to the median voter's ideal point. This leads to antimajoritarian outcomes and stymies policy change. The rule deserves attention and reform.
APPENDIX
We identified every set of conflicting proposals that appeared on the ballot between 1980 and 2006 in eight states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and South Dakota. These states frequently use direct democracy and represent diverse geographies. All use the highest vote rule or have no rule in place for handling conflicting ballot proposals.
To identify conflicts, we examined proposition titles, the text of propositions, media reports, and judicial opinions. Conflicts were divided into three categories. Category 1 encompasses proposals with major provisions that conflict. Category 2 encompasses proposals with minor provisions that conflict and proposals that plausibly are substitutes so voters want one or the other to pass but not both. Category 3 includes proposals that do not contradict one another but occupy a common policy dimension.
Regardless of category, for every set of competing measures we identified the one proposal closest to the status quo-that is, the proposal that made the smallest change in policy on a single, narrow dimension. We based our selections on policy provisions directly comparable across proposals. For example, conflicting propositions in California increased taxes on Native American tribes' casino revenues, and we selected the proposal with the smaller tax increase as the one closest to the status quo (Propositions 68 and 70, November 2004 election). Similarly, conflicting propositions in Arizona restricted smoking in bars and banned smoking in bars, and we selected the former as the one closest to the status quo (Propositions 201 and 206, November 2006 election).
Wherever possible, we verified our selections with media reports. For example, conflicting measures in California imposed restrictions on pesticide use (Propositions 128 and 135, November 1990 election). We selected the one that appeared less stringent and confirmed that the press described it as the milder proposal (for example, Diringer 1990). For some complicated measures, we relied primarily on media reports to determine their effect and then assessed which offered the smallest change in policy. We illustrate this approach with conflicting measures in California that imposed restrictions on political campaign contributions (Propositions 68 and 73, June 1988 election). We could not confidently determine which was closer to the status quo, so we turned to media reports and learned that Proposition 73 was widely understood to be less extreme (for example, Witt 1988) .
After identifying which measure in each set of competing proposals was closest to the status quo, we checked whether that measure received the most affirmative votes. If it did, that signals support for the sincere-voting hypothesis.
In some instances we could not determine with certainty which proposal was closer to the status quo.
23 Despite the single-subject rule, we could not always 23. Propositions 200 and 204 (Arizona, November 2000 election) illustrate the difficulties that sometimes arose in determining which proposal was closest to the status situate competing propositions on a single policy dimension. Some conflicts were bidirectional. For all such conflicts, we could not conduct this analysis.
We identified 39 sets of category 1 competing proposals. Of those sets, the proposal closest to the status quo got the most votes 16 times and did not get the most votes 11 times. In the other 12 instances, we could not conduct the analysis.
We identified 11 sets of category 2 competing proposals. Of those sets, the proposal closest to the status quo got the most votes five times and did not get the most votes two times. In the other four instances, we could not conduct the analysis.
We identified six sets of category 3 competing proposals. Of those sets, the proposal closest to the status quo got the most votes three times. In the other three instances, we could not conduct the analysis. Table A1 lists the state, election date, proposition name, and vote count for every proposal in our study. It also summarizes each proposal, identifies the type of conflict between them, and notes whether the vote totals support the sincerevoting hypothesis. Conflicts marked "yes" support the hypothesis, conflicts marked "no" do not support the hypothesis, and other conflicts are marked "unclear."
quo. Both measures sought to improve the state's health care system. Proposition 204 insured more people than Proposition 200, but Proposition 200 implemented more new programs. Proposition 200 was considered to be the "business" proposal, but it also enjoyed the support of some unions (as did Proposition 204) and state hospitals, which presumably wanted a more expansive program. Both proposals passed, and Proposition 204 received more votes. 
